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I. INTRODUCTION
High Definition Television (HDTV) is a major step in the technolog-
ical advancement of television.1 Conventional television will give way to
HDTV in the next decade because HDTV delivers a clearer picture and
better sound than its forerunner. HDTV will provide twice the picture
resolution of conventional television and unlike today's television,
HDTV will look better on a larger screen, with picture quality similar to
that of a 35mm motion picture.2 HDTV's audio quality will be equal to
that of a compact disc. The superior performance of HDTV will dramat-
ically improve the quality of home entertainment systems, but HDTV
represents far more than just better television.
HDTV will benefit information systems in general. Its potential to
merge with computer technology will have a profound effect on graphics
displays used in medical diagnosis, engineering design and manufactur-
ing, and office communications. Higher resolution displays will also have
various military applications, including intelligence imaging, high fidelity
simulation displays, and command center displays. The demand for ad-
vanced television systems will not be limited to household consumers.
The potentially broad market for HDTV products indicates that a
competitive domestic HDTV industry would benefit the United States in
a variety of ways. In the United States, however, governmental interven-
tion into the marketplace and cooperative ventures have traditionally
been disfavored.' Japanese and European firms, which rely heavily on
1. "HDTV" is one of several acronyms used in connection with video technologies. Other acro-
nyms that will be important to the reader are "ATV", which stands for Advanced Television;
"EDTV", which stands for Enhanced Definition Television; "VCR", which stands for Video Cas-
sette Recorder; and "the NTIA", which stands for the National Telecommunications and Informa-
tion Administration, a branch of the Department of Commerce.
ATV is a generic and broad term for any system that improves television quality. HDTV and
EDTV are subsets of ATV; HDTV represents a completely new approach to television, while EDTV
is the product of efforts to improve existing systems. The terms ATV and HDTV are often used
interchangeably by various sources, and for purposes of this article the distinction between them is
generally not important. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing
Television Broadcast Service, 3 F.C.C.R. 6520, 6544 n.1 (1988) (Tentative Decision and Further
Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter Further Notice].
2. HDTV images have resolution and an aspect ratio very similar to those of motion picture
images. Aspect ratio is the ratio of the image's width to its height. Most proposed HDTV systems
are designed to provide an aspect ratio of 16:9 rather than the 4:3 ratio of conventional television,
thus giving HDTV the wide screen appearance of a motion picture. See K. BLAIR BENSON & DON-
ALD G. FINK, HDTV: ADVANCED TELEVISION FOR THE 1990S 1.1 to 1.2 (1991).
3. Disfavor of governmental intervention into private market activities, or "laissez-faire," has
been a guiding principle behind U.S. economic policy, particularly with regard to international
trade, since the end of World War II. Just after World War II, the United States was the world's
premier military and economic power, and thus it was willing and able to push for more open and
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government sponsorship and teamwork, have moved ahead of U.S. firms
in the race to develop and market advanced television products.' Despite
the changing nature of the world economy in which countries, rather
than companies, often compete against one another, U.S. policy has re-
mained the same.' In order for U.S. firms to enter the HDTV market,
they must assume much of the risk themselves.
Nevertheless, there is one area in which the federal government will
play a role in the nurturing of a domestic HDTV industry: the selection
of technical standards which will govern HDTV production and trans-
mission.6 Standards will influence U.S. involvement in the HDTV indus-
restraint-free global trade to maximize its commercial advantages in capital, raw materials, and fin-
ished goods and services. Although America's global commercial power was declining during the
1980s, the Reagan administration continued to embrace the tradition of laissez-faire in the face of a
changing world economy, and the principle remains prevalent today. See ROBERT KUTrNER, THE
END OF LAIssEz-FAIRE: NATIONAL PURPOSE AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY AFTER THE COLD
WAR 6-7 (1991).
Suspicion toward cooperative ventures is an element of antitrust sentiment, a prevalent shaper of
American economic policy and legislation during the past century. Federal antitrust policy is rooted
in the Sherman Act of 1890, and has evolved into a complex web of laws that some believe has stifled
innovation and damaged America's ability to compete internationally. See generally ROBERT H.
BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX (1978). See also Paul Magnusson, The Antitrust Ball and Chain
Hobbling High Tech, Bus. WK., July 29, 1991, at 34.
4. In Japan, development of HDTV was begun in the early 1970s by Japan's government-spon-
sored national broadcasting company, Nippon Hoso Kyokai (NHK). NHK has transferred its
HDTV technology, free of charge, to private sector firms. These firms have been and are currently
converting this technology into commercial products. A working HDTV system was first demon-
strated in 1981, and today NHK provides satellite transmission of HDTV on a limited basis. See
NTIA, Advanced Television, Related Technologies, and the National Interest 20-21 (Mar. 1989)
[hereinafter ATV and the National Interest], reprinted in High Definition Televisiorn Hearing Before
the House Comm on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 49-89 (1989) [hereinafter
HDTV Hearing]. See also Hugh C. Donahue, Choosing the TV of the Future, TECH. REV., Apr.
1989, at 30, 32.
Coordinated European efforts to develop HDTV began in 1985, when major manufacturers in-
cluding Philips (The Netherlands) and Thomson (France) first teamed up. In 1986, the European
Community funded an HDTV research and development consortium called "Eureka '95". SeeATV
and the National Interest, supra, at 21-23; see also infra note 44.
5. See 135 CONG. REc. H1816 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lipinski); see gener-
ally JOHN M. CULBERTSON, THE TRADE THREAT AND U.S. TRADE POLICY (1989).
6. Technical standards are rules and conventions that must be adhered to by those who produce
HDTV equipment and programming in order to make HDTV feasible as a mass medium. An exam-
ple of a technical standard is the use of 35 mm film throughout the film industry. Certain key
physical parameters must be kept constant to ensure compatibility among equipment which creates
HDTV programming, equipment which delivers HDTV programming, and equipment which re-
ceives and displays HDTV programming. By maintaining consistency in such characteristics as
picture shape and the frequency with which pictures are redrawn, technical standards ensure that
HDTV signals are fundamentally similar and can be received and processed by equipment designed
in accordance with those standards. For examples of production and transmission standards, see
infra parts IV, V.
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try and affect mass media competition in this country as the inevitable
conversion to the new technology occurs. The issue of standards has
both domestic and international ramifications. The goal of this Com-
ment is to expose the importance of HDTV to U.S. interests, and to ex-
amine what standards policy the federal government should adopt in
light of those interests. First, the need for a successful domestic HDTV
industry is underscored by a discussion of the economic and military
benefits that such an industry may provide. This is followed by recogni-
tion of the isolated and primary role standards will play in the develop-
ment of a domestic HDTV industry, given the federal government's
reluctance to facilitate development by means which are more direct than
merely choosing standards. Once this foundation has been laid, the is-
sues and options surrounding the selection of standards will be analyzed
with regard to the two general types of technical standards: production
standards and transmission standards.
II. THE IMPORTANCE OF HDTV TO THE UNITED STATES
HDTV and related technologies have garnered the attention of fed-
eral policy makers because these technologies represent an opportunity
for the United States to improve its global economic competitiveness in
the coming decades. Policy makers are also concerned that if the United
States does not foster a strong HDTV industry, critical defense applica-
tions of HDTV technologies will depend on foreign know-how. Beneath
the economic and military concerns lies a more fundamental reason for
the recent Congressional and administrative interest in HDTV:7 the
United States is no longer alone at the forefront of high technology devel-
opment. On a basic level, HDTV has come to symbolize a proving
ground for this country's spirit of innovation.
A. Market Forecasts and Economic Benefits
A primary reason HDTV has become the focus of policy debates is
that it has been portrayed as a potential spark for the U.S. economy.
With the exception of Zenith Electronics Corporation, U.S. firms have
abandoned the consumer electronics industry, causing manufacturing
jobs to disappear and the trade deficit to escalate.' HDTV may offer an
7. See infra part III.
8. While the U.S market for consumer electronics items such as radios, televisions, and video
cassette recorders has been growing steadily, the share of that expanding market controlled by do-
mestic firms had decreased from close to 100 percent in the early 1950s to about 5 percent by the late
1980s. See MICHAEL L. DERTOUZOS ET AL., MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
[Vol. 40
SETTING STANDARDS FOR HDTV
opportunity for the United States to re-enter the international consumer
electronics industry and market, provided that policy decisions - in-
cluding those involving standards - are wisely made. While the eco-
nomic significance of HDTV in the coming years is difficult to predict, it
is clear that even limited domestic HDTV production will create new
jobs and help lower the trade deficit.
In assessing the potential impact of HDTV on the U.S. economy,
the first task is to define the scope of the HDTV industry. Because the
results of an economic forecast depend largely on what is included under
the title "HDTV industry," arguments for both broad and narrow inter-
pretations have been at the core of the economic impact debate. Various
groups have studied the economic prospects for HDTV, and four major
reports produced in 1988 and 1989 examine the future role of the HDTV
industry in our economy. The first of these reports was prepared for the
National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA),
a branch of the Department of Commerce, by Darby Associates of
Washington, D.C.9 The second report was written by a team from the
American Electronics Association. 10 Also, the Electronic Industries As-
sociation commissioned a study by Robert R. Nathan Associates." Fi-
nally, the Congressional Budget Office issued its own report, which was
chiefly an evaluation of the previous three studies.12 The studies ana-
lyzed market size and the effects U.S. market-share will have on such
areas as domestic employment and the trade deficit.
The market forecasts made in each of the reports predict that the
value of HDTV sales will grow steadily during the next two decades. By
the year 2010, the U.S. market value for HDTV receivers and VCRs will
likely reach the $10 billion mark, and may even surpass that figure by a
COMM'N ON INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTIVITY, MADE IN AMERICA: REGAINING THE PRODUCTIVE
EDGE 217-30 (1989).
9. Larry F. Darby, Economic Potential of Advanced Television Products (Apr. 1988) (prepared
for the NTIA) [hereinafter NTIA Report], reprinted in Prospects for Development of a U.S. HDTV
Industry: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 433-91
(1989) [hereinafter Prospects for Development].
10. American Electronics Association, High Definition Television (HDTV): Economic Analysis
of Impact (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter AEA Report], reprinted in Prospects for Development, supra note
9, at 300-39.
11. Robert R. Nathan Associates, Television Manufacturing in the United States: Economic
Contributions-Past, Present, and Future (Feb. 1989) (prepared for the Electronic Industries Associ-
ation) [hereinafter EIA Report], reprinted in Prospects for Development, supra note 9, at 340-432.
12. Congressional Budget Office, The Scope of the High-Definition Television Market and Its
Implications for Competitiveness (unpublished staff working papers, 1989) [hereinafter CBO Report],
in Prospects for Development, supra note 9, at 61-94.
1992"]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 40
significant amount. 3 "The potential impact on national income and
pressure on domestic employment of this level and value of realized U.S.
household consumer expenditure may reasonably be expected to be sub-
stantial."14 Furthermore, the world market for HDTV receivers and
VCRs could reach $40 billion by the year 2010.15 Such a large demand
will also stimulate the market for semiconductors and other components
used in HDTVs, so that the consequences of U.S. participation could be
enormous; many jobs and our balance of trade are at stake.
1. Employment Effects. The extent to which HDTV will create
new jobs is dependent on market growth, and thus there is reason to
believe that employment effects will be considerable. The NTIA analysis
sets the potential number of jobs directly created by domestic HDTV
manufacturing at 35,000 by 1998, with another 65,000 jobs created indi-
rectly through HDTV's influence on related industries." The Electron-
ics Industries Association report projects the total number of HDTV-
related jobs will reach 128,000 by the year 2003.17 Furthermore, the
13. The NTIA report presents two scenarios: one rapid growth and the other slow growth. The
rapid growth scenario envisions a domestic annual market value of $21.6 billion by the year 2008,
with annual sales reaching 18 million units for HDTV receivers and 11 million units for HDTV-
compatible VCRs, while the slow growth scenario places the total market value at $10.8 billion that
same year. The dollar figures quoted are assumed to be in 1988 dollars, as no inflation rate was
provided in the report. See NTIA Report, supra note 9, at 29-38.
The American Electronics Association report forecasts an annual market value of $10.8 billion by
the year 2010, with 11 million HDTV receivers and 9 million HDTV-compatible VCRs being sold in
the United States. Once again, dollar figures are assumed to be in 1988 dollars. See AEA Report,
supra note 10, tables I through 4 and accompanying text.
The Electronic Industries Association study places the domestic market value at $11.8 billion by
the year 2003, based solely on sales of HDTV receivers, which it forecasts will reach 13 million units
that same year. The dollar figure taken from the EIA report has been discounted to 1988 dollars
using a 3.5 percent annual rate of inflation. See EIA Report, supra note 11, table IV-3 and accompa-
nying text.
14. A7TV and the National Interest, supra note 4, at 12.
15. The American Electronics Association predicts $18 billion in HDTV receiver sales and over
$22 billion in HDTV VCR sales worldwide. AEA Report, supra note 10, tables 2, 3 and accompany-
ing text.
16. The estimate of directly related jobs is based on the value added to sales of consumer elec-
tronics by one worker, in 1983, for every $27,000 worth of consumer electronics goods valued by
U.S. consumers, one person was employed. The NTIA study projects the total direct value added
through HDTV sales will be $960 million in 1998, which would create about 35,000 jobs. The total
number of jobs created, both directly and indirectly, was estimated by multiplying the number of
direct jobs by a factor representative of the secondary income and employment effects derived from
direct value added. See NTIA Report, supra note 9, at 42-43 (using multiplier method from AR-
THUR D. LITTLE, CONSUMER ELECTRONICS: A $40 BILLION AMERICAN INDUSTRY (1985)).
17. The Electronic Industries Association projection is based on a value-added-to-jobs ratio sim-
ilar to the method used in the NTIA report. See EIA Report, supra note 11, at 65-73. The Elec-
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number of jobs created is not of sole importance; the type of jobs created
is also economically significant. New opportunities will be centered
around high technology, whether they involve research and development
of new equipment or servicing the same. "[I]t is expected that many of
the jobs linked to ATV will be not only challenging and rewarding, but
that they will also encourage the development and maintenance of skills
vital to future U.S. competitiveness throughout the economy."18 Em-
ployment estimates depend on a great many variables and assumptions,
including a high level of U.S. HDTV production; federal standards will
help determine participation by American companies and will thereby
influence the actual employment effects realized from HDTV.
2. Trade Balance Effects. In addition to the employment benefits,
a thriving HDTV industry may decrease the U.S. trade deficit. Forecasts
of a large U.S. market for HDTV receivers and related equipment' 9 un-
derscore the importance of a domestic HDTV industry to our trade defi-
cit: if U.S. firms do not enter their home market, consumers will be
forced to buy HDTV items from the Japanese and others, thus contribut-
ing further to the current imbalance.2 0 Improving our trade balance by
increasing U.S. productive performance is vital to maintaining the over-
all high standard of living in this country.2 The Economic Policy Insti-
tute has concluded that weak U.S. participation in the HDTV market
could result in a staggering $227 billion trade deficit in related electronics
industries by the year 2010.22 However, after its analysis of the three
tronic Industries Association report asserts that there will be no net employment impact from the
introduction of HDTV into the U.S market because "[c]ompensating differences in [volume of pro-
duction, product mix, and sources of inputs] suggest that HDTV will have no net employment im-
pact on the [TV] pipeline." Id. at 70. However, the manufacturing jobs at the source of the TV
pipeline are currently located outside of the United States, with only distribution jobs located here.
HDTV has the potential to relocate valuable manufacturing jobs into the United States and shift the
emphasis of distribution from an import-based posture to an export-based posture, provided that
government policy shifts toward a more active role. The fact that the Electronic Industries Associa-
tion is made up of foreign firms may explain the Electronic Industries Association's willingness to
understate the employment prospects of HDTV.
18. ATV and the National Interest, supra note 4, at 14.
19. See supra note 13.
20. According to figures released by the Electronic Industries Association, the U.S. trade deficit
in consumer electronics was $2.4 billion for the first three quarters of 1991. Christmas Came Late
and With Little Profit, COMM. DAILY, Dec. 31, 1991, at 5, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library,
Comdly File.
21. DERTOUZOS, supra note 8, at 33-35.
22. The industries are HDTV receivers and VCRs, personal computers, semiconductors, and
automated manufacturing equipment. See Robert Cohen, The Consequences of Failing to Develop a
Strong HDTV Industry in the United States (Economic Policy Institute Briefing Paper, Washington,
19921
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market forecasts discussed above, the Congressional Budget Office down-
played the impact HDTV would have on U.S. competitiveness by con-
cluding that "it is unlikely that HDTV will by itself revitalize the U.S.
electronics sector."2 The Congressional Budget Office report was heav-
ily criticized, though, for taking a narrow view of the HDTV industry.24
The report prepared for the NTIA concluded that
home video products are a major source of the deficit and, consequently, a
line of business where some potentially remedial steps might generate sub-
stantial payoffs. That is the good news. The bad news is that the trade
account could be dramatically worsened if US households do not have a
domestic option for ATV products and instead satisfy their entire demand
for these products from sources abroad.25
The value of HDTV to strong free-trade and U.S. competitiveness will
become evident in the coming years, a fact that has not escaped notice by
our competitors.26
The economic ramifications of U.S. participation in the HDTV in-
dustry should not be ignored. Even in the most pessimistic scenario, the
HDTV industry is worth fostering and should not be hindered by poor
selection of technical standards. The domestic and world markets for
HDTV products will be large, and failure by U.S. firms to gain a signifi-
cant share of these markets will mean at best a greater degree of under-
employment, and at worst a higher level of unemployment. If U.S.
consumers are forced to purchase foreign-made equipment, the United
D.C.), reprinted in 135 CONG. REC. S3481-82 (daily ed. Apr. 6, 1989) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
The inter-relatedness of these industries will act to compound the losses due to non-participation.
See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF ADVANCED TELEVISION SYSTEMS: A STAFF REPORT PRE-
PARED FOR THE USE OF THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE
COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (1989) [hereinafter PUBLIC POLICY
IMPLICATIONS] (American Electronics Association response to request for HDTV action
memoranda).
23. CBO Report, supra note 12, at 28.
24. Critics included the American Electronics Association, which called the Congressional
Budget Office report a "narrow academic exercise" that "ignores a plethora of data which points to
HDTV as a driver technology and fails to ascertain the true dimensions of the international electron-
ics industry." Prospects for Development, supra note 9, at 103 (testimony of American Electronics
Association presented by Tom Long, Tektronix, Inc.). Dr. Robert Cohen, a consultant to the Amer-
ican Electronics Association, testified that the Congressional Budget Office viewpoint "is a direct
result of [the Congressional Budget Office] being unwilling to consider the broader applications of
high definition systems." Id. at 126. Juan A. Benitez, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Commerce
for Science and Electronics, noted that the Congressional Budget Office report is "inaccurate in some
areas," specifically in regard to its pessimistic conclusions regarding demand for U.S.-made semicon-
ductors. Id. at 100.
25.- NTIA Report, supra note 9, at 44.
26. Far-sighted initiatives already begun in Japan and Europe are an indication that our com-
petitors view HDTV as a worthwhile endeavor. See supra note 4.
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States will transfer wealth to nations such as Japan who are poised to
seize the American market. U.S. standards policy should account for the
economic dynamics of HDTV's inevitable growth.
B. National Security
National security has been offered as another rationale for the im-
portance of a robust HDTV industry to the United States. HDTV tech-
nologies, both existing and potential, are highly dependent on
semiconductor technology; the Department of Defense realizes that
many other defense technologies (most importantly computers) rely
heavily on state-of-the-art semiconductors and thus the Pentagon is in-
terested in using the HDTV industry as a catalyst for the revival of the
domestic semiconductor industry. The fact that HDTV will allow
sharper, clearer displays for critical functions is of importance to the mil-
itary; 7 more importantly, "the Pentagon itself needs a strong commer-
cial economy for many products vital to the national defense. If, for
example, the U.S. semiconductor industry were to vanish, the Pentagon
would either depend on foreign producers for a strategic product or
would maintain an in-house semiconductor industry at astronomical ex-
pense." 28 During wartime or in times when war appears imminent, na-
tional security may require an increase in the supply of various high-
technology items. Because the technologies change too rapidly, such
items cannot be easily stockpiled during peacetime. Additionally, foreign
suppliers may not be in a position to meet increased demand, or they
may wish to halt supplies to the United States altogether. As Dr. Craig
Fields, Director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency
(DARPA), stated, "[from a defense point of view we want to minimize
our dependency on foreign sources for the essential elements of our
weapons systems. Those essential elements certainly are centered on
semiconductors."29 The failing semiconductor industry,30 an industry
27. Perhaps HDTV displays could have prevented some of the casualties suffered by coalition
forces during operation Desert Storm as a result of "friendly fire," given that the existing weapons
systems "were unable to discern the difference between enemy vehicles and allied vehicles because
the sighting display equipment was too fuzzy." 137 CONG. Rac. H6927 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1991)
(statement of Rep. Bentley).
28. Robert Kuttner, Industry Needs a Better Incubator than the Pentagon, Bus. WK., Apr. 30,
1990, at 16.
29. High Definition Television-Developing a National Technology Strategy for High Definition
Television: Hearing Before the Subcomm. of Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1989) [hereinafter National Tech-




whose products have key defense applications, may be driven by in-
creased development of HDTV.
Efforts to stimulate research and development of defense applica-
tions for HDTV have been overseen by DARPA, however cutbacks in
the agency's funding have crippled those efforts. In 1989, DARPA re-
ceived a strong response from private industry when it announced it
would spend $30 million among worthwhile proposals submitted by
firms willing to take part in HDTV projects for the military. Although
$30 million is a relatively small amount (considering DARPA's budget
in excess of $1 billion), considerable interest was shown by U.S. compa-
nies seeking funding.31 Despite this encouraging reaction from the pri-
vate sector, the Bush administration later urged diversion of $20 million
away from HDTV research.32 In 1991, the House of Representatives in-
cluded $100 million for research and development of HDTV flat panel
display technologies in the Department of Defense appropriations bill for
fiscal year 1992, but the Office of Management and Budget categorized
the funding as being primarily for the development of a commercial tech-
nology, and the Department of Defense was forced to request that the
Senate disallow the funding.33 Therefore, despite the role HDTV could
play in reviving the semiconductor industry and easing U.S. dependence
on foreign high-technology, the current administration appears unwilling
to make the relatively small investment in research and development that
would likely bring results. The perceived military needs will remain, and
30. The U.S. semiconductor industry peaked in the mid-1970s when it held 60 percent of the
world market; by 1987, the U.S. share of the world market had eroded to 40 percent, and recent
projections of rapid growth for the world market itself indicate that the relative position of the
United States in the world market will continue to slip. See DERTOUZOS, supra note 8, at 248-61.
31. DARPA received over eighty proposals seeking a share of the dedicated funds, with re-
quests for funding totaling about $200 million. The contents of the proposals were termed "out-
standing," and industry showed a great willingness to share costs. See HDTV Hearing, supra note 4,
at 100-01 (statement of Dr. Craig Fields); U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
THE BIG PICTURE: HDTV & HIGH-RESOLUTION SYsTEMs 36-37 (1990) (Background Paper) [here.
inafter THE BIG PICTURE].
32. Hill Reaction Explosive Administration Reportedly Wants to Divert DARPA HDTVFunds to
Other Uses, COMM. DAILY, Apr. 9, 1990, at 1, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Comdly File.
33. 137 CONG. REc. H6927 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1991). The Department of Defense policy of
rejecting appropriations that are aimed at developing commercial, as opposed to military, technolo-
gies is an example of the reluctance of the federal government to intervene in the private market-
place. See supra note 3. However, this policy may be abandoned if it interferes with a political
agenda, as it was in regard to the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) backed by the Reagan adminis.
tration. The Pentagon's Strategic Defense Initiative Office has established a database of SDI tech.
nology for use by the private sector. See Gary Anthes, SDI Information Database Available for
Commercial Use, COMPUTERWORLD, Dec. 17, 1990, at 6.
[Vol. 40
SETTING STANDARDS FOR HDTV
they will be met mainly by foreign suppliers if HDTV is not supported by
the federal government.
C. Technological Leadership
Aside from the economic and military aspects of HDTV, there ex-
ists a perception by some that the outcome of the advanced television
battle will reflect on the position of the United States as a world leader in
general. HDTV has been singled out as the cornerstone of future Ameri-
can success in all fields of high technology.34 As one commentator
wrote,
[t]he ramifications of HDTV have expanded beyond technology and mar-
keting into the realm of politics. The political and legislative questions
raised by the push for "high-def" promise to be far more difficult to resolve
than the technical problems. From Capitol Hill to the Pentagon, HDTV
has become the lightning rod for marshalling concern over the future of
"good old" American leadership.35
Treating HDTV as an indicator of America's innovative strength is
understandable given the pervasiveness of television as a mass medium in
our society. The general public is more apt to measure the technological
status of the United States by assessing advances made in a commonplace
item - the television - rather than by focusing on breakthroughs in less
visible items, such as computer memory chips. Because the public can
readily appreciate improvements in television, rhetoric that appeals to
the symbolic meaning of HDTV competition is valuable as a tool to rally
support for pro-HDTV initiatives. Nevertheless, such rhetoric tends to
overstate the significance of HDTV as it relates to our position as a world
leader in high technology. As will be discussed later, U.S. firms have not
fallen behind their international competitors on a technological level.
Where U.S. firms have fallen behind is in the ability to efficiently manu-
facture and market items that are within their capability to create.36 The
economic and strategic concerns discussed above provide more substan-
34. "HDTV has become a symbol of the importance of technological development to U.S. com-
petitiveness. Many see developments in the TV business as our nation's 'once in a lifetime opportu-
nity' to seize dominance in nearly every technology." National Technology Strategy Hearing, supra
note 29, at 57 (statement of Donald F. Johnstone, President and Chief Executive Officer of Philips
Consumer Electronics Co., a Division of North American Philips Corp.). See also Jack Shandle &
Amy Rosewater, Political Lightning Rod: In the US., HDTV is Becoming a Focal Point for the
Competitiveness Issue, ELECTONICS, Oct. 1990, at 57.
35. Jerry Whitaker, Foreword to BENSON & FINK, supra note 2, at xiii (1991).
36. See generally DERTOUZOS, supra note 8, at 67-80; Stephen Mraz, U.S. Must Put R&D to
Work, MACHINE DESIGN, Apr. 25, 1991, at 24; Anthony L. Velocci, Slow Pace of Technology Inno-
vation Tied to Short-Sighted U.S. Policies, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Jan. 13, 1992.
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tial justification for setting U.S. standards policy so as to give the HDTV
industry a chance to survive in this country. Patriotic arguments based
solely on "technological leadership" may sound persuasive, but they ac-
tually miss the point. Taking advantage of our technological leadership,
not establishing it, is the point behind supporting a domestic HDTV
industry.
III. GOVERNMENTAL NONINTERVENTION AND
THE ROLE OF STANDARDS
The federal government has three general means of improving the
probability that HDTV will succeed as an industry in the United States.
First, the government can directly allocate funds for research and devel-
opment in the private sector. An example of such an approach is men-
tioned above: the $30 million in DARPA grants. A second way in
which the government can help industry is to create an atmosphere con-
ducive to private investment in HDTV, primarily through relaxation of
existing antitrust laws, tax incentives for research and development, and
stricter enforcement of antidumping laws.37 Finally, the federal govern-
ment can aid the cause by adopting technical standards for production
and transmission of HDTV programs in an intelligent manner. Setting
helpful technical standards in a timely manner is essential to the effec-
tiveness of any financial or legislative assistance; "all the money in the
treasury won't put the U.S. into the HDTV picture unless we have a
comprehensive U.S. standards policy that will help promote the interests
37. Antidunping laws are designed to prevent foreign competitors from engaging in the preda-
tory trade practice of "dumping". Dumping involves selling goods at below cost in a competitor's
market and is often done in conjunction with protectionist trade barriers that allow the seller to
charge inflated prices in its domestic market. By dumping goods, a seller can force competition out
of an industry, after which it can raise prices to above-cost levels. For a more technical explanation
of dumping, see John H. Jackson, Dumping in International Trade: Its Meaning and Context, in
ANTIDUMPING LAW AND PRACTICE 1-22 (John J. Jackson & Edwin A. Vermulst eds., 1989).
Far Eastern producers, taking advantage of loopholes in U.S. antidumping laws and the lack of
aggressive enforcement, used dumping to effectively eliminate U.S. companies from the television
manufacturing industry. This has prompted a push for better antidumping measures. See National
Technology Strategy Hearing, supra note 29, at 40 (statement of Jerry Pearlman, President and Chief
Executive Officer, Zenith Corp.). See also JOHN M. CULBERTSON, THE TRADE THREAT AND U.S.
TRADE POLICY 192-93 (1989) (discussing the vulnerability of the United States to dumping due to
the lack of an effective trade policy); Ruth S. Raubitschek, Discussion, in TRADE FRICTION AND
ECONOMIC POLICY: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS FOR JAPAN AND THE UNITED STATES 230, 235
(Ryuzo Sato & Paul Wachtel eds., 1987) ("Dumping is difficult to measure in a high technology
industry because of the dynamic nature of costs and prices. Furthermore, the current legal process
for relief is too slow to be effective given the fast pace of innovation in the [semiconductor]
industry.").
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of both the U.S. consumer and U.S. industry, and this is an appropriate
role for government leadership."3 Technical standards, while crucial for
the potential catalytic role they may play in combination with other gov-
ernment measures, will take on greater significance as Congress and the
Bush administration retreat from supporting HDTV. While other ac-
tions are contingent upon budgetary constraints and politics, standards
will eventually be adopted. One further thing is certain: technical stan-
dards will have an effect on the growth of HDTV in this country with or
without funding and legislation facilitating domestic investment in
HDTV manufacturing.
A. Legislative Efforts
Presently, the most likely scenario appears to be one in which the
federal government does little more than adopt standards. Legislative
plans to provide direct funding for HDTV initiatives, discussed below,
have fallen prey to deficit reduction efforts. Antitrust reforms and tax
incentives aimed at helping U.S. companies rejoin the consumer electron-
ics industry, also treated below, have likewise lacked widespread support.
As these measures succumb to political and ideological opposition, com-
panies interested in entering the HDTV industry may be discouraged
from doing so, particularly if the federal government does not demon-
strate to industry that it has a coherent strategy for the adoption of tech-
nical standards.
The list of unenacted bills drafted to directly stimulate domestic in-
vestment in HDTV research and development illustrates a trend of gov-
ernmental nonintervention. In February of 1989, Representatives
Richard Boucher (D-VA) and Thomas Campbell (R-CA) introduced the
National Cooperative Innovation and Commercialization Act of 1989.11
The bill established a framework within which firms may seek adminis-
trative approval for cooperative innovation agreements and thus avoid
criminal and civil antitrust actions; it was referred to the House Commit-
38. High Definition Television: The International HDTV Standard-Setting Process and the Role
of International Standards on U.S. Competitiveness Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International
Scientific Cooperation of the House Comm. on Science, Space, and Technology, 101st Cong., Ist Sess.
38, 41 (1989) [hereinafter International HDTV Standard-Setting Process Hearing] (statement of
Daniel S. Lankford, Market Development Vice President, AT&T Microelectronics). While the hear-
ing dealt substantially with international production standards, Mr. Lankford's statement was made
in the context of comments concerning both domestic transmission standards and international pro-
duction standards. See id. at 42-44.
39. H.R. 1024, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). See House Bills, 2 Cong. Index (CCH) 28,212,
35,014 (1989).
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tee on the Judiciary and then to the House Subcommittee on Economic
and Commercial Law, but no further action was taken. That bill was
soon followed by the High Definition Television Competitiveness Act of
1989, ° a measure sponsored by Representatives Donald Ritter (R-PA)
and Mel Levine (D-CA) which contained provisions creating financial
assistance programs and tax incentives for research and development, as
well as antitrust exemptions for HDTV joint ventures.41 The Act also
would have appropriated an additional $500,000 to the Federal Commu-
nications Commission (FCC) for fiscal year 1989 to enable the Commis-
sion to study the question of an HDTV broadcast standard, but it never
made it to the House floor. The High Definition Television Research and
Development Act of 1989,42 which sought to improve the competitive-
ness of the domestic HDTV industry through a program of cooperative
research and development and technology-sharing, died in committee.
Representative Ritter also co-introduced the Advanced Television Com-
petitiveness Act of 1989,41 which would have established an industry
consortium partially financed by government loans and grants." At the
same time, a Senate bill designed to legitimize such joint ventures
40. H.R. 1267, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989), reprinted in HDTVHearing, supra note 4, at 330.
41. Financial assistance is contemplated under H.R. 1267 through competitive applications sub-
mitted to the Secretary of Commerce by interested cooperative HDTV enterprises. H.R. 1267, 101st
Cong, 1st Sess. §§ 302-306 (1989). The Act also attempted to create tax incentives for HDTV re-
search and development by repealing § 4(g) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, which provides a
termination date of the tax credit for increasing research expenditures, and by repealing § 280(c) of
the Code to allow a tax deduction for amounts allowed as a research credit. Id. at § 102. Antitrust
obstacles would have been removed by the Act via amendment of the Communications Act of 1934
to provide an exception for cooperative HDTV enterprises, and via amendment of the National
Cooperative Research Act of 1984 to include cooperative HDTV enterprises under its protection.
Id. at §§ 202-203. See HDTVHearing, supra note 4, at 330-42.
42. H.R. 1516, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) reprinted in HDTV Hearing, supra note 4, at 342.
43. H.R. 2287, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
44. The consortium envisioned by the authors of the bill is modelled after a European HDTV
joint venture known as Eureka '95. See HDTV Week on Capitol Hill, BROADCASTING, May 15,
1989, at 67, 68. Eureka '95 was begun in 1986 by Bosch of West Germany, Philips of the Nether-
lands, Thomson of France, and Thorn-EMI of the United Kingdom, and today it includes many
more European electronics companies. Eureka '95 is a result of the European Eureka program, a
joint research and development effort that promotes and helps to fund multicorporation, multina-
tional projects. Eureka '95 has been successful in adopting its own set of production standards for
HDTV, with both European and U.S. markets in mind. A large factor in the success of Eureka '95 is
that participating companies retain all rights to technologies developed within the program, which
provides companies with an incentive to devote resources to the venture. See generally Alan G.
Stoddard & Mark D. Dibner, Europe's HDTV- Tuning Out Japan, TECH. REV., Apr. 1989, at 39.
There has been some effort by private U.S. corporations to join together despite the lack of gov-
ernment assistance. Xerox is reportedly organizing a research and development consortium that will
invest over $100 million in developing flat-panel display technology for HDTV. Newstrack- HDTV
may be the Ace, COMM. ACM, Dec. 1990, at 10.
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through amendment of antitrust laws was introduced,4' but neither bill
was successful. Another. proposed action that lacked the necessary votes
for passage was the High Definition Television Act of 1990,46 a plan to
prohibit interstate commerce in high definition television sets that do not
contain minimum levels of domestic hardware.47 Finally, the Advanced
Television Standards Act of 199041 failed to attract the support needed
for passage, even though its primary purpose was to provide momentum
and coherence to the standard selection process rather than commercial
incentives for domestic initiatives.49
The onslaught of legislative proposals has failed to generate any
meaningful assistance for the infant HDTV industry. The reason govern-
ment is hesitant to back the private sector on HDTV is linked to the fact
that technical standards have not yet been chosen. Generally speaking,
government wants industry to take the lead in developing HDTV.50 In-
dustry, however, is waiting for government to reduce the risks involved
in joining the new industry; at the very least, potential HDTV manufac-
turers need to know what standards will prevail to allow them to focus
their research and development efforts. The situation is somewhat circu-
lar, considering that government has necessarily solicited private input
45. S. 952, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
46. H.R. 4764, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
47. The scheme set out in the bill calls for a gradual increase in the percentage of U.S. made
parts and components that make up an HDTV set based on value. Interstate commerce in and
importation of sets that do not meet minimum domestic content requirements would be prohibited.
During its first year in the market, a company would have to include 10 percent U.S. parts; this
requirement increases to 30 percent in the third year and levels off at 51 percent during the fifth year
of market participation. See 136 CONG. REc. E1456 (daily ed. May 9, 1990) (statement of Rep.
Gejdenson).
48. H.R. 4933, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990).
49. The bill, which had been approved by the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and
Finance for full Committee action, authorized appropriations to the FCC for the establishment of an
advanced television task force, the purchase of testing equipment, and the hiring of any additional
personnel needed to develop and promulgate a transmission standard. Also, the bill sought to place
the NTIA in charge of U.S. policy regarding adoption of international production standards. Id.
50. Commerce Secretary Robert Mosbacher expressed Bush administration sentiment that
although HDTV is viewed as being important, competitive forces should drive efforts to develop
HDTV, not government planning. See Shakeout Likely: NAB Displays Show Rapid Maturation of
HDTV, COMM. DAILY, May 2, 1989, at 3, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Comdly File. Also,
the Bush administration sent a clear message that it does not want DARPA meddling in the creation
of a federal "industrial policy" by removing DARPA director Craig Fields from his post in April of
1990. The move was a response to Fields' outspoken support for government-funded high technol-
ogy initiatives. The ouster was not well-received. See, eg., Trends, Forecasts and Analyses:
DARPA Chief Out, INSIDE R&D, May 2, 1990, at 2; Elizabeth Corcoran, Talking Policy: The Ad-
ministration Devises an Industrial Policy-Sort of, Sci. Am., June 1990, at 82.
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toward the selection of standards.5 Until standards are set, industry will
be slow to move on HDTV.
B. Standards as the Primary Policy Option
The lack of support for vigorous and direct pro-HDTV legislation,
discussed above, has by default left the standard-setting process at the
forefront of government's involvement in promoting HDTV.
Lawmakers have permitted the process to move forward by allowing
bodies such as the FCC and the Department of State to take action on
proposed standards. It is likely that an amended version of the Emerging
Telecommunications Technologies Act of 1991,52 already passed in the
House, will make it through the Senate. The Act requires the Secretary
of Commerce to make additional frequencies available for commercial
assignment in order to promote new telecommunications technologies;
this would facilitate the FCC's selection of a transmission standard for
HDTV given HDTV's need for additional spectrum.5" The NTIA Or-
ganization and Authorization Act,54 if enacted, will permit the NTIA to
continue its active role in the international debate over production stan-
dards, although the Department of State will remain the ultimate voice
of U.S. policy in that area.55 With the defeat of legislative efforts to help
mobilize private investment in HDTV, industry continues to await the
outcome of the administrative standards-selection process.
It is possible that once standards are chosen and more U.S. compa-
nies begin to commit resources to HDTV development, Congress will
remain content to be a spectator in the battle for market-share. Thus,
51. In a Notice of Inquiry released on August 20, 1987, the FCC solicited comments from
industry groups and other interested parties in regard to advanced television broadcast issues. See An
re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Television Broadcast Service, 2
F.C.C.R. 5125, 5129-39 (1987) (Notice of Inquiry) [hereinafter Notice of Inquiry]. The FCC again
requested public input to narrow advanced television broadcast issues in a Further Notice of Inquiry
released on September 1, 1988. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6520, 6534-41.
52. H.R. 531, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
53. See infra part V.
54. H.R. 3031, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
55. The Advanced Television Standards Act of 1990, which was never passed, would have put
the NTIA in charge of U.S. policy toward international standards. H.R. 4933, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
§ 4 (1990). The Committee on Energy and Finance, in its favorable report on the NTIA Organiza-
tion and Authorization Act, noted that the NTIA "has taken an increasingly active role in interna-
tional telecommunications issues" and "has protected U.S. interests in the critical [area] of technical
standards." H.R. Rep. No. 335, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991). Nevertheless, H.R. 3031 explicitly
provides that "[n]othing in this Act reassigns any function.., vested by law or executive order in the
Federal Communications Commission or the Department of State, or any officer thereof." H.R.
3031, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. § 4(0(3) (1991).
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standards may be the only way in which the federal government will in-
volve itself in the development of HDTV in this country. The standards
adopted will have an effect on who is willing to take the risks of entering
the industry. On a domestic level, broadcasters will have to compete
with cable operators, video retailers, satellite feeders, and perhaps even
phone companies 6 for a share of the HDTV viewing audience. On an
international level, U.S. HDTV manufacturers must battle with Japanese
and European oligopolies for world market share. Standards will effect
the degree of acceptance HDTV will gain in this country, and they will
help determine whether HDTV is viewed on U.S. or foreign-made sets.
If proper standards are chosen, the result may be a demand for HDTV
broadcasts from local broadcasters that will be viewed on domestically
produced sets; if not, the dominant video media will probably be cable
and foreign-made video cassette recorders connected to foreign-made tel-
evision sets. It is crucial that the government chooses standards wisely.
IV. PRODUCTION STANDARDS
A. Definition and Background
Production standards pertain to the technical parameters associated
with equipment used in the creation of an HDTV program, and therefore
they affect the compatibility of programs with viewing equipment. An
example of a production standard is the 35mm standard for films; foreign
films may be viewed with the same equipment used to view Hollywood
films because they adhere to the same production standards. An example
of an HDTV production standard is the number of horizontal lines that
make up the picture; more horizontal lines translate into a sharper pic-
ture. Another example is the frequency of picture scanning, or the
number of times per second that the picture is electronically redrawn.
The issue of production standards is, by nature, an international one,
because uniformity of production standards among trading partners
greatly facilitates market exchange in HDTV programming. Presently,
the status of worldwide production standards for HDTV is unsettled.
There is a basic disagreement between Europe and Japan over produc-
tion standards, with each side touting its own proposal as being best
suited for worldwide adoption. The Japanese Broadcasting Co. (NHK)
has developed and promoted a system based on 1125 horizontal lines and
56. Phone companies may someday be allowed to transmit programming over fiber-optic phone
lines. Regional phone companies would be able to justify the cost of installing fiber-optic cables to
every residence if they were legally allowed to carry video. William J. Cook, Spoils of a Good Air
War, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Sept. 10, 1990, at 75.
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a 60 hertz 7 redraw frequency (1125/60), while the European Commu-
nity insists on a 1250/50 standard.58 Because electricity is delivered to
homes and offices in the United States at 60 hertz, the European 50 hertz
standard would be difficult to implement here.59 Thus the basic question
for U.S. policy makers is whether the United States should adopt the
NHK 1125/60 standard, or whether it should develop a production stan-
dard of its own. The United States must choose its HDTV production
standards to maximize economic opportunity; doing so, however, may
mean sacrificing trade opportunities in HDTV programming for trade
opportunities in domestically manufactured HDTV equipment.
B. Policy Considerations
If the United States is to have any chance of competing in the world
HDTV marketplace, it should continue to resist the temptation to adopt
the NHK standard. Justification for this stance may be found by recog-
nizing U.S. technological capabilities and the structure of U.S. media, as
well as the low probability that any standard will be accepted as the sole
worldwide standard. A domestic production standard will not serve as a
trade barrier, given that competitors will eventually build equipment that
will conform to any standard that controls in a significant market,60 but
it will allow the United States to compete. Although it will take much
more than a national approach to production standards to insure a large
market-share for U.S. producers, "[a] unique indigenous standard...
can have a major impact on the development of an infant industry like
this one. It also provides the only means for making sure special condi-
tions or peculiarities of the market are taken into account., 61 In this
section, the policy considerations that will influence the selection of pro-
duction standards will be discussed. Policy regarding the selection of a
production standard has been, and continues to be, influenced by two
major factors: international trade in HDTV programming and the
unique nature of the U.S. marketplace.
57. One hertz is equal to one cycle per second, so 60 hertz equals 60 cycles per second.
58. See discussion infra part IV.B.1.
59. Not only would the European format be costly to implement here, it has also been shown to
be inferior to the Japanese standard in almost all tested categories by a Moscow research group. See
1,125/60 HDTVStandard Wins Head-to-Head Competition with Europeans, COMM. DAILY, July 27,
1990, at 4, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Library, Comdly File.
60. The Japanese have already indicated that they are prepared to build HDTV products in
accordance with any western standards which may be adopted. See Consumer Electronics; Telly
Diplomacy, ECONOMIST, May 19, 1990 (Business), at 78; Satoshi Isaka, Makers Set to Cope with Two
HDTV Standards, JAPAN ECON. J., Mar. 17, 1990, (Industry), at 13.
61. 135 CONG. REC. S3481 (1989) (statement of Sen. Heinz).
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1. The Present U.S. Stance. The international body attempting to
resolve the issue of production standards is the International Radio Con-
sultative Committee (CCIR). The CCIR is a permanent branch of the
International Telecommunications Union, a specialized agency of the
United Nations charged with the coordination, regulation, and standard-
ization of telecommunications worldwide. U.S. interests at the CCIR are
represented by the Department of State, which acts on recommendations
from the FCC, the Department of Commerce (through the NTIA), and
private sector organizations such as the Advanced Television Systems
Committee, among others. 2 In 1986, the CCIR attempted to standard-
ize studio production parameters for HDTV at a meeting in Dubrovnik,
Yugoslavia. At that session, the United States favored adoption of the
Japanese NHK system; nevertheless, representatives from West Euro-
pean nations successfully blocked its selection.6" The stalemate resulted
in a four year period during which new HDTV proposals could be sub-
mitted prior to the CCIR's next meeting on the issue in May of 1990.
During this time, U.S. opposition to the Japanese standard gained mo-
mentum,' the result of which has been a retreat by the United States
from support for international adoption of a compromise "common im-
age format"6 to a position recently taken by the Commerce Department
that the United States should avoid any world HDTV production agree-
ments until more advanced technology is developed. 6 The 1990 gather-
ing of the CCIR produced agreement on some parameters, however no
agreement was reached regarding the two key variables: the number of
horizontal scan lines and the image redraw frequency. 7 The CCIR has
62. For a more detailed description of the structure behind U.S. policy formulation in this area,
see Sonia Landau, Toward a Global High-Definition TV Production Standard, DEP'T ST. BULL.,
June 1989, at 48-49.
63. See CCIR Puts End to Hope for HDTV Standard, BROADCASTING, May 19, 1986, at 70.
64. Criticism that the State Department had exceeded its authority in advocating the NHK
standard came from House Commerce Committee Chairman Dingell and Telecommunications Sub-
committee Chairman Markey, who introduced legislation to place the Department of Commerce in
charge of U.S. policy on production standards. See Markey Bills Put HDTV Work Under Commerce
Roof, BROADCASTING, Mar. 12, 1990, at 34; New Turf War: Dingell and Markey Attack State De-
partment HDTV Activities, COMM. DAILY, Mar. 13, 1989, at 2, available in LEXIS, Fedcom Li-
brary, Comdly File.
65. A "common image format" would standardize all production parameters except the redraw
rate, which is the basic obstacle to an international consensus. See Randall M. Sukow, State of the
Art: Television Technology, BROADCASTING, Oct. 15, 1990, at 42.
66. See Markey Bills Put HDTV Work Under Commerce Roof, BROADCASTING, Mar. 12, 1990,
at 34.
67. Rules Set For New-Era TV, But Key Standards Still Open, REUTER BUSINESS REPORT,
May 24, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Busrpt File.
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opted to conduct further studies before addressing the issue at its next
plenary session in 1994. The extra time is a mixed blessing for the
United States, which now has time'to develop and submit its own pro-
duction standard for consideration by the CCIR, but must also contend
with the reality that the Japanese standard may emerge as a de facto
standard due to the delay." Even if a defacto standard does not emerge,
it is clear that the basic disagreement between Japan and the European
Community will continue to thwart efforts to agree upon a universal and
comprehensive set of production standards. It is against this background
that U.S. policy must be refined.
2. International Trade in HDTV Programming. One factor which
U.S. policymakers must consider is the importance of global standardiza-
tion to U.S. programming producers and exporters. Producers and ex-
porters fear that postponement of efforts to reach international
agreement on production standards will jeopardize international trade in
HDTV programming for two reasons: program producers in the United
States will be unable to justify purchasing HDTV studio equipment that
may be rendered obsolete by a new standard, and lack of a worldwide
standard will add conversion costs to programming exports. For these
reasons, producers and exporters favor the 1125/60 NHK standard. 9
"The United States will be the biggest casualty if a single worldwide pro-
duction standard is not established, because the U.S. is the largest ex-
porter of programming throughout the world."70 This argument is too
narrow because it ignores the effects a Japanese standard will have on
68. The confusion regarding worldwide standards has prompted Japanese companies to seek out
commercial customers willing to buy costly first-generation HDTV equipment that conforms to the
NHK standard. By doing so, the companies hope the NHK standard will gain widespread unofficial
acceptance. See Peter Burrows, Japan is Ready for HDTV, But the Rest of the World Isn't, ELEC-
TRONIC Bus., Aug. 20, 1990, at 30, available in Lexis, Nexis Library, Elebus File.
69. See Ron Whittaker, US. Programming Edge Depends on HDTV, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, June
19, 1989, at 52. An organization consisting of production equipment manufacturers and program
production companies, calling itself the "1125/60 HDTV Production Group," submitted a letter
dated February 1, 1989, to the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance. The
letter urged U.S. support for the 1125/60 standard, claiming that the standard would be beneficial to
U.S. commercial interests. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 513-22. The true
motivation of the group may have been to further Japanese commercial interests, given that the
group's membership included such Japanese-owned companies as Hitachi Sales Corporation, Sony
Corporation of America, Mitsubishi Electronics, Toshiba America, and U.S. JVC (Japan Victor
Corporation).
70. HDTV Production Standard Debated at NTIA, BROADCASTING, Mar. 13, 1989 (statement
of Jeff Mullarkey, assistant vice president, Toshiba America Inc.). Not surprisingly, this viewpoint
is shared by CBS Inc., a major programming exporter. See PULIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 22, at 136-51.
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HDTV manufacturing, and it also ignores the reality that Europe will
not adhere to the 1125/60 standard. While the United States may enjoy
a trade surplus in programming exports, the value of that surplus will be
dwarfed by the downward pull a Japanese standard would have on the
consumer electronics and semiconductor industries.71 The argument is
also overly optimistic in view of Europe's adamant refusal to adopt any
standard but its own.7" The European market for programming, which
contributes to our trade surplus, will probably adhere to a different set of
production standards, making U.S. programming products more costly
due to conversion problems. If the U.S. selects the NHK standard, it
risks allowing the Japanese a huge edge in economies of scale without
ever realizing the trade benefits a single worldwide standard might bring.
The ideal scenario, from a U.S. perspective, would be for the rest of the
world to rally around a standard developed and tested in the United
States with peculiarities of the U.S. market in mind. Given the potential
size of the U.S. markets for equipment and programming,7" Japanese and
European producers may even find it economically advantageous to con-
form to U.S. standards.74
3. The Unique Nature of the U.S. Marketplace. Another factor
that officials from the FCC, NTIA and State Department must consider
is the distinct form of the U.S. communications infrastructure. The
NHK standard was selected with neither the U.S. need to accommodate
new technologies nor the U.S. video media structure in mind, and thus it
is substantively deficient for use in this country. A domestically devel-
oped production standard will permit U.S. firms to take advantage of
digital technology, and it will harmonize video production with Ameri-
can transmission practices.
By not prematurely rushing into agreement on production stan-
dards, the United States will preserve an opportunity for domestic com-
71. The current U.S. trade surplus in motion pictures and television programming is approxi-
mately $3 billion. However, the potential U.S. trade deficit in HDTV-related industries could exceed
$200 billion if domestic firms are not able to compete on the world market. See Whittaker, supra
note 69, at 52; supra note 22 and accompanying text.
72. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
73. For a discussion of the U.S. market for equipment, see supra part II.A. The U.S. market for
entertainment programming should also be large, based on consumer expenditures in past years. In
1990, Americans spent approximately $30 billion to view filmed entertainment. Of that total, almost
50 percent was spent for home viewing of cable television; 35 percent went for rental or purchase of
videos, and the remaining 15 percent was spent at movie theaters. See Leisure Time Basic Analysis,
Mar. 14, 1991, in STANDARD & POOR'S INDUS. SURV., at L29 (Apr. 1991).
74. See supra note 60.
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panies to study and develop technologies which may render Japanese and
European formats obsolete. Currently, both the NHK and European
systems are analog-based; with its strong computer industry to assist it,
the United States can develop a higher quality digital-based HDTV sys-
tem.7 A digital-based HDTV system would lead to a greater variety of
applications than an analog-based system, including computerized multi-
media systems in the home.76 If the United States adopts the analog
Japanese standard, it will prevent American firms from utilizing their
technological superiority to surpass world competitors. By focusing on a
digital approach to HDTV, the United States can "leap-frog" the Japa-
nese and Europeans.
77
The analog nature of current technology is not the only weakness of
the Japanese system, insofar as U.S. interests are concerned. The NHK
production standard was originally designed to interact with a satellite
transmission system, the basic programming medium in Japan. The U.S.
media structure relies far more heavily on local broadcasting and cable to
bring television into homes and offices, and so the Japanese format is
technically inadequate for the U.S. market. The same flaw exists for the
European standard.7"
The systems proposed... are very wasteful of spectrum and bandwidth.
They are clever in some respects but they are poorly designed to be compat-
ible with existing television; there's no transition strategy whatsoever; they
require complicated converters. Instead, they have been optimized for di-
rect satellite delivery, not over-the-air broadcasting, not cable, not future
fiber.79
75. Analog-based items are driven by signals in the form of a wave. For example, televisions,
grooved records, cassette tapes, and telephones are all analog-based. Wave-form signals are subject
to distortion during passage through a medium such as a wire, and thus exact reproduction of an
analog input signal by the signal receiver is impossible. Digital technology, which is the foundation
for modem-day computers, uses a binomial coding system in which all signals consist of ones and
zeroes. The input signal is the same as the output signal in a digital-based system. An example of
digital technology is the compact disc. A digital-based HDTV system could be linked to computer
systems to produce many new graphics applications.
76. An ideal "digital home of the future" could include some dazzling features, including auxil-
iary equipment for a home entertainment system that would allow the user to edit images and music
with ease, and a feedback controller that would enable the user to respond to interactive television
programs. For a discussion of potential applications of digital technology, see Otis Port et al., High-
Definition TV is Rallying a Digital Revolution, Bus. WK., Jan. 30, 1989, at 64'
77. National Technology Strategy Hearing, supra note 29, at 148 (statement of John J. Sie, Se-
nior Vice President, Tele-Communications, Inc.).
78. See, eg., Helmut Schafer, A European View of Competition and Control in a Multimedia
Society, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY 405 (Eli
M. Noam ed., 1985).
79. International HDTV Standard-Setting Process Hearing, supra note 38, at 65 (statement of
SETTING STANDARDS FOR HDTV
Because the question of transmission standards is still unsettled in this
country, it would be a disservice to the television media to adopt a set of
production standards designed to be compatible with Japanese transmis-
sion practices.
It is fortunate that the United States is now aware of the inadequa-
cies inherent in the Japanese system. The State Department is no longer
plunging blindly into acceptance of the NHK standard, as voices down-
playing the need for that standard have been heard. Proponents of the
Japanese standard have lobbied hard for its adoption, primarily because
they realize the economic stakes involved. 0 The United States, however,
has come to realize that "the principal motive behind pushing the NHK
system is, and the main effect of adopting it would be, to advance Japa-
nese economic interests to the detriment of our own."8" The United
States government must do more than merely reject the NHK standard
- it must promote research and selection of production standards which
are digital-based and which allow for an adequate transition to HDTV in
the U.S. television market. By doing so in a timely fashion, problems
encountered by programming producers and exporters will be mini-
mized. While standardization remains a desirable concept, it is unrealis-
tic to expect that it will be achieved; the best the United States can do is
forge ahead with its own standard and hope that other countries decide
to follow.
V. TRANSMISSION STANDARDS
A. Definition and Background
The success of the HDTV industry in the United States is linked not
only to international production standards, but also to domestic trans-
mission standards. Transmission standards govern the way in which we
receive HDTV programming. There are four basic media by which
HDTV will be viewed in the near future: terrestrial ("over the air-
waves") broadcasting, cable, direct broadcast satellite, and VCRs. An-
other prospective medium under development is optical fiber. All of
Richard Solomon, Research Associate, Program on Communications Policy and The Media Labora-
tory, MIT).
80. Japanese-owned firms in the United States have been quick to express their opinion that the
1125/60 standard is the one best suited for worldwide adoption. See supra note 69. "Given their
lead in developing HDTV technology and their desire to penetrate foreign markets, the Japanese
have worked intensively to ensure that their standard was adopted worldwide." THE BIG PICTURE,
supra note 31, at 32.
81. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 549 (comment of William Schreiber, Di-
rector, Advanced Television Research Program, MIT).
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these media have transmission standards, but terrestrial broadcasting is
unique in that its transmission standard is the only one subject to govern-
mental regulation and constraints. Terrestrial broadcasting is federally
regulated because it uses a portion of the electromagnetic spectrum,
which is a scarce resource. Currently, television channels are each allot-
ted 6 MHz of bandwidth in which to broadcast.82 HDTV signals will
require additional spectrum because they must transmit more electronic
information to produce a sharper image. Thus the FCC, which has juris-
diction over broadcast licensees and is charged with managing the spec-
trum, must choose a transmission standard for HDTV broadcasts that
overcomes the problem of spectrum scarcity. The FCC has established
an Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service to coordinate
the task. 3
B. Policy Considerations
Given spectrum constraints, an HDTV transmission standard must
be selected with high picture quality and compatibility with non-HDTV
signals in mind. Quality and compatibility considerations are important
to a young HDTV broadcasting sector because they will effect the ability
of local broadcasters to compete with cable, direct broadcast satellite,
and VCRs for the HDTV viewing audience. From a quality standpoint,
local broadcasts will be compromised due to the aforementioned spec-
trum scarcity. The other media are free of spectrum constraints and may
seek to attain the highest quality audio and video technologically possi-
ble. From a compatibility standpoint, local broadcasters must be af-
forded a chance to compete when HDTV is first introduced, so that
transmission standards should accommodate traditional television broad-
casts for consumers who have yet to switch to HDTV. Local broadcast-
ing should not be disadvantaged in the transition to HDTV because it is a
82. Bandwidth is analogous to lanes on a freeway. Channels cannot be placed too close together
or interference will result. Interference is prevented in two ways: stations that use the same channel
are separated by a required minimum distance, and stations in the same broadcast area transmitting
in the Ultra High Frequency (UHF) band of the spectrum are separated by empty channels. This is
why the television channels in a city might be 2, 4, and 7 as opposed to 2, 3, and 4. The empty
channels are known as the UHF taboos. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6529.
83. The Advisory Committee was created in 1987 to study and make recommendations regard-
ing the technical, economic, and public interest problems associated with the introduction of ad-
vanced television in the United States. The Advisory Committee is composed of industry leaders
and representatives from television broadcast networks and stations, equipment manufacturers, cable
systems, and the communications bar. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6522; Formation of
Advisory Committee on Advanced Television Service and Announcement of First Meeting, 52 Fed.
Reg. 38,523 (1987).
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vital part of the U.S. media structure; "[b]roadcasting in the United
States, due largely to this country's great land mass and heterogeneous
population, is based on federally fostered principles of localism, which
encourage responsiveness to issues of local importance." 4 The FCC
should not force a single transmission standard upon all media to ensure
balanced competition; rather, it should adopt a technically solid standard
which meets the special needs of broadcasting and which allows broad-
casters to provide problem-free transmissions on a par with other media.
The proper stance for regulators to take can be summarized as follows:
The federal government should support a friendly family of standards to
enable competing media-broadcast, cable, satellites-to have as level a
playing field as possible in bringing HDTV to American consumers. The
federal government should not adopt a single standard for all media indus-
tries. The key issue is to promote a standard or friendly family of stan-
dards, which promote the greatest number of voices reaching the American
people, and maximum US participation in HDTV.
8 5
A "family of standards" means a set of standards for competing media
that places minimal restrictions on transmission while ensuring that
some form of inter-media compatibility is feasible.
1. Quality Concerns. The issue of quality is of major importance to
cable and satellite companies who do not want a standard forced upon
them which will inhibit their ability to offer a high-quality transmission.
The issue is somewhat more complex for cable companies, because over
half of U.S. households receive broadcast programming through cable
transmission.86 The National Cable Television Association expressed its
position this way:
84. ATV and the National Interest, supra note 4, at 28.
85. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 310 (Action Memo by Hugh Donahue,
MIT).
86. Id. at 699 (statement of National Cable Television Association).
The increasing penetration of cable as a video medium has been recognized as a threat to local
broadcasting, regardless of any advantage cable operators might gain from HDTV. Because cable
companies and local broadcast stations compete with each other for advertising revenues, there is
economic incentive for cable systems to terminate retransmission of local broadcast signals. Legisla-
tion, passed in the Senate, would amend the Communications Act of 1934 to ensure carriage on
cable television of local news and other programming. See S. 12, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). But
cf. Harry Bloch & Michael D. Wirth, The Broadcasters: The Future Role of Local Stations and the
Three Networks, in VIDEO MEDIA COMPETITION: REGULATION, ECONOMICS, AND TECHNOLOGY
121, 122 (Eli M. Noam ed., 1985):
The impact of competition from cable ... on television station and television network
audiences... does not necessarily mean that any stations or networks will be driven out
of business. In fact, increased competition on the information/entertainment side of the
video marketplace may not even cause a decrease in their profitability, because cable...
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[a]part from their role as conduits for the delivery of broadcast signals,
cable and other media have certain characteristics and capabilities that may
enable them to provide unique HDTV servies .... Thus, while standardi-
zation may be necessary for broadcast transmission of HDTV, alternative
video distribution media should be left free to maximize their particular
technical capabilities in the marketplace.
87
The Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Association of America
formulated its stance in free-market terms, stating that "the market
should be as free from standardization as possible, to allow the consum-
ers to be the ultimate decision makers." 8 While such an argument is
appealing, it ignores the unique role of local broadcasting in our media
structure, which is to provide free programming with attention to local-
ized concerns. A frightening scenario appears when one imagines this
country without local broadcasters: centralized programming from cable
networks that lack any incentive to inform viewers on issues of local im-
portance or to respond to local needs. The erosion of community and the
democratic process would begin at the level of city and town government
in much the same way as it would if an area's voters were forced to rely
on USA Today for all their information. Taking this vision to an ex-
treme, it would be far easier for a desperate federal government to dis-
seminate propaganda over a centralized mass medium than to force
thousands of local broadcasters to air its message. Adoption of a single
transmission standard based on terrestrial broadcasting's quality limita-
tions would unnecessarily interfere with the quality offered by competing
media, but completely rejecting any degree of standardization for alter-
nate media is not in the overall best interests of the consumer. Picture
quality is important to the consumer, but it is not so important that it
should be a reason to jeopardize the status of local broadcasting in this
country.
2. Transitional Compatibility Problems and Solutions. For con-
sumers, the transition from conventional television to HDTV is likely to
involve a substantial investment in a new receiver; at the outset of HDTV
market penetration, a single set will probably cost between $2,500 and
$4,000.19 A majority of consumers will be forced to wait until prices
drop before HDTV becomes affordable. Transition will be gradual, so
[does] not provide meaningful competition for television broadcasters on the advertising
side of the video marketplace... at this time.
87. PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 699-700 (statement of National Cable
Television Association).
88. Id. at 788 (report of Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Association of America).
89. The Electronic Industries Association predicts the initial average price of an HDTV set will
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transmission standards must be designed to accommodate traditional tel-
evision signals as well as HDTV signals.90 The FCC's search for a suita-
ble transmission standard was formalized in a Notice of Inquiry released
in August of 1987.91 The purpose of the Inquiry was to acquire informa-
tion that would help the FCC better understand the advantages and dis-
advantages of various ATV broadcast options. 92 Three fundamental
approaches to implementation emerged from the proposals considered by
the FCC.
The first approach merely involves trying to get higher quality out
of the existing NTSC broadcast standard, and is known as enhanced defi-
ition television (EDTV).93 Advocates of an EDTV system have been
quick to emphasize that such a system would be a low-cost alternative to
true HDTV, that it requires no more bandwidth than the 6 MHz pres-
ently allotted each channel, and that it is completely compatible with the
NTSC system.94 The FCC would not have to significantly alter the pres-
ent NTSC standard in order to implement EDTV, because the increase
in quality would result from the way transmitters and receivers process
signals, not from any fundamental difference in the signal itself. Broad-
be $2,500. EIA Report, supra note 11, at 49. The American Electronics Association, however,
predicts that early units will sell for about $4,000. AEA Report, supra note 10, at 2-4.
90. Since 1941, television receivers have been based on standards developed by the National
Television System Committee (NTSC) and adopted by the FCC. The NTSC standard specifies 6
MHz of bandwidth per channel, and has remained essentially unchanged since its inception. Be-
cause the NTSC standard reflects the technological limitations of the early days of broadcast televi-
sion, it is seen as somewhat of a relic today. See Notice of Inquiry, supra note 51.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 5126.
93. See supra note 1.
94. A leading EDTV format was developed by Yves Faroudja and Faroudja Laboratories, and
is known by the trademark "SuperNTSC". See Donahue, supra note 4, at 30, 34. The basic idea
behind SuperNTSC is to mimic HDTV quality by using filters in transmission equipment to prevent
light and color signals from interfering with each other, and by using digital memory in receivers to
store a frame and then interlace it between the horizontal lines of the next frame (thus doubling the
number of horizontal lines). See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 454-55 (overview
of SuperNTSC provided by Faroudja Laboratories, Jan. 3, 1989); Further Notice, supra note 1, at
6524. For consumers, the expected cost of a SuperNTSC receiver will be about 20 percent greater
than the cost of a conventional receiver, making the system economically attractive. Hans Fantel,
Bringing the Television Image Into Focus, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1989, § 2, at 8.
Another leading EDTV system was developed by the David Sarnoff Research Center under spon-
sorship from the National Broadcasting Corporation, Philips Consumer Electronics, and Thomson
Consumer Electronics, Inc. The system, dubbed "Advanced Compatible Television," was the first
system to be tested at the FCC's Advanced Television Test Center in Alexandria, Virginia. See Jim
Carries, How We Fared in the HDTV Testing Process, ELECTRONIC MEDIA, Oct. 14, 1991, at 20;
First Advanced Television System Moves into ATTC Test Facility, PR NEWSWIRE, June 25, 1991,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Prnews File.
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casters, who fear steep costs will be involved if they must upgrade their
equipment to deliver true HDTV, have come out in favor of EDTV.95
Critics of EDTV, however, charge that it is technologically inferior to
HDTV and that it will only delay the inevitable transition to true
HDTV. FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes has called EDTV a "technological
mouse,"96 and William Schreiber, director of MIT's Advanced Televi-
sion Research Program, remarked that "[n]othing would be more expen-
sive than a failed venture into EDTV." 97 Indeed, broadcasters and
consumers would both be forced to make two investments in new equip-
ment if EDTV is used as a stepping stone toward the introduction of
HDTV, and thus EDTV is not as economical as it appears. The FCC
should be far-sighted in its solution to the transmission problem, and
thus it should decline to embrace an EDTV scheme.
Another approach to delivering higher quality television over the
airwaves is known as "augmentation." Augmentation involves transmit-
ting the 6 MHz NTSC signal over one channel while also transmitting a
complementary signal over another channel that is currently left open to
avoid interference.98 The complementary signal could carry information
needed to generate a wider, clearer picture and digital sound. An aug-
mentation system developed by the National Broadcasting Company, the
David Sarnoff Research Center, and Thomson Consumer Electronics,
Inc. uses an evolutionary approach culminating in a 12 MHz HDTV sig-
nal sent over an existing channel and an adjacent, empty channel.99 The
evolutionary system was designed with speedy consumer acceptance in
mind."co Other augmentation systems that would only require an addi-
tional 3 MHz of spectrum not necessarily adjacent to the existing chan-
95. The cost of upgrading a terrestrial broadcaster's NTSC equipment to HDTV capability
could fall between $7.4 million and $40 million. See THE BIG PICTURE, supra note 31, at 21. The
National Association of Public Television Stations expressed its justifiable concern that public televi-
sion, which relies heavily on federal funding, may not be able to afford an upgrade to HDTV given
that "the total cost [of $3 billion for approximately 300 public stations] would nearly equal all of the
federal government's expenditures over the last 20 years." PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra
note 22, at 624.
96. Peter Lambert, HDTVSpectrum: "Use It or Lose It", BROADCASTING, Nov. 11, 1991 at 14.
97. William F. Schreiber, Thinking the Unthinkable: A Commentary on High-Definition Televi-
sion, BROADCASTING, July 11, 1988, at 32.
98. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6531; see also supra note 82.
99. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6524; Donahue, supra note 4, at 30, 36.
100. For an account of the policy viewpoints that are touted by the developers, see NATIONAL
BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC. ET AL., ADVANCED TELEVISION IN THE UNITED STATES: A RE-
PORT TO THE HOUSE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE (1989), reprinted in PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at
625-94.
[Vol. 40
SETTING STANDARDS FOR HDTV
nel have been proposed.101 A major drawback associated with
augmentation systems is that although they are able to provide true
HDTV in a way that is compatible with NTSC, they do so in an ineffi-
cient manner because they rely on the outmoded 6 Mhz NTSC signal; at
no time can the NTSC standard be discarded under an augmentation
approach.
The third means by which HDTV transmission may be accom-
plished is by simulcasting. A television station would broadcast pro-
gramming via the 6 MHz NTSC signal on one channel and an
independent 6 MHz HDTV signal on another. The key to this approach
is the ability to fit a complete HDTV signal into 6 MHz of bandwidth.
Zenith Electronics Corporation has developed a 6 MHz HDTV signal
that is completely nonreliant on the NTSC format."°2 Initially, the
simulcast path to HDTV transmission would encounter the same spec-
trum constraints that an augmentation approach would face, but eventu-
ally it would allow for the complete phase-out of the old NTSC standard.
Consumers could upgrade to HDTV receivers when they become
affordable.
C. The Future Direction of Policy
The FCC has decided to give viewers a choice between conventional
television and HDTV by adopting a simulcast HDTV standard. In Au-
gust of 1990, the Commission finalized several policy decisions to narrow
the scope of the transmission standard debate, with the most important
decision being to adhere to a simulcast system for HDTV.10 3 Augmenta-
tion was ruled out as an option because it would be less spectrum efficient
and more difficult to implement than a simulcast system."° The Com-
101. North American Philips and the New York Institute of Technology have developed 6+3
augmentation systems. See Further Notice, supra note 1, at 6525.
102. The Zenith system would pack the HDTV signal into 6 MHz of bandwidth by using a
combination digital-analog hybrid signal. See Donahue, supra note 4, at 38.
103. Id. See In re Advanced Television Systems and Their Impact on the Existing Broadcast
Service, 5 F.C.C.R. 5627 (1990) (First Report and Order) [hereinafter First Report and Order].-
104. In the words of the FCC,
We do not find it useful to give further consideration to systems that use additional
spectrum to "augment" an existing 6 MHz television channel to provide NTSC compati-
ble service. While we recognize that an augmentation system could provide improve-
ments in service quality over that of the NTSC system, such a system would be less
spectrum efficient and more difficult to implement than a 6 simulcast MHz design. As
MIT observes, a simulcast system ultimately will allow the NTSC and HDTV channels
to be used independently. The augmentation systems before us do not appear to offer
improvements in the quality of television service equal to or greater than could be pro-
vided by a 6 MHz simulcast system. This is because their operational designs are con-
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mission did not rule out the selection of an EDTV system if one emerged
that could "provide quality comparable to that of an HDTV system and
be more cost effective for both broadcasters and consumers,"105 but re-
cent posturing by the FCC indicates the chances of an EDTV system
being adopted are slim.'06
By selecting a simulcast strategy rather than an augmentation strat-
egy, the FCC divorces HDTV technology from conventional technology,
which will prevent the old standard from becoming "a millstone around
the necks of today's broadcasters."'107 Simulcasting will not only allow
consumers a choice, it will also provide better quality than the augmenta-
tion approach. Further testing is necessary, but the FCC hopes to have
simulcast standards in place in 1993.108
The decision by the FCC to adopt a simulcast standard will help
local broadcasters to compete with the other media, and that will help
HDTV to gain acceptance in the United States and cause the HDTV
market to grow accordingly. Although the federal government is reluc-
tant to set a single standard that would affect cable and direct broadcast
satellite, it should act to promote a friendly family of standards among
the media. Specifically, the FCC should require minimal standardization
for alternative media only to the extent that ensures that their signals can
be processed by open-architecture receivers."° A family of standards
strained by the technical limitations inherent in the NTSC system. Thus, it does not
appear that there would be any gain in service from using the additional spectrum.
Id. at 5628.
105. Id. at 5629.
106. The FCC emphasized that it did not expect to select an EDTV standard prior to a decision
on an HDTV standard, if at all. Id at 5629. FCC Chairman Alfred Sikes commented that the
simulcast HDTV option has "greater public interest promise" than does EDTV. Randall M. Sukow
& Harry A. Jessell, Slim ChanceforEDTVAppears to Get Slimmer, BROADCASTING, Sept. 10, 1990,
at 26. The skeptical stance of the FCC may have prompted Faroudja Laboratories to withdraw its
SuperNTSC system from the FCC testing process. Faroudja failed to submit a testing fee of $87,500
before it was due. See id. at 26.
107. Schreiber, supra note 97, at 32. The FCC avoided alarming television broadcasters and
consumers by not declaring that the current NTSC would someday be eliminated when it published
its decision to pursue a simulcast transmission standard. Nevertheless, statements such as "simul-
cast systems are not constrained by the limitations inherent in the NTSC technology" and "a simul-
cast system ultimately will allow the NTSC and HDTV channels to be used independently" infer
that the FCC is pointing toward the day when the NTSC standard may be discarded. See First
Report and Order, supra note 103, at 5628.
108. See Jay Malin, FCC Begins Testing to Pick New U.S. TV System, WASH. TIMES, July 15,
1991, at B5.
109. The open-architecture receiver is currently under development at MIT. Its sophisticated
circuitry permits it to handle multiple standards, and to be easily upgraded using hardware or
software. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 569 (Action Memo submitted by the
Media Laboratory at MIT).
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based on open-architecture receivers will produce greater economic bene-
fits than a single standard imposed on all media."1 ' Moreover, broad-
casters will still be able to compete, and there will be room for advances
in technology specific to each particular medium.
The FCC, through its Advanced Television Service Committee, is
coordinating tests for various transmission standards. By eliminating
augmentation standards from consideration, the FCC has moved a step
closer to adopting a transmission standard for terrestrial broadcasts.
Broadcasters need a standard that permits them to provide quality trans-
missions that can compete with cable and direct broadcast satellite, but
at the same time does not force them to suddenly abandon the old stan-
dard compatible with conventional receivers. The FCC must now ex-
amine the function of open-architecture receivers as they relate to
transmission standards, so that a set of completely incompatible stan-
dards does not emerge for media transmissions not currently regulated
by the FCC. Preservation of local broadcasting can be accomplished
without sacrificing quality and technological innovation.
VI. CONCLUSION
The U.S. government can no longer rely on private market forces to
buoy American innovation and competitiveness in the world market-
place. Countries such as Japan and Germany have recognized that high-
technology industries will be vital to their future economic health, and
governmental actions in those countries have reflected this. The Japa-
nese have been especially determined to comer high-technology markets
through protectionist trade practices and heavy government funding for
cooperative ventures. The Bush administration continues to follow a
course of laissez-faire economics with strict antitrust regulation while our
competitors do just the opposite with far greater success.
This country must begin to realize that the playing field will never be
even. Our responsibility now is to ensure an environment that fosters long-
term investments for all domestic industries. As a nation, we must decide
which industries are vital to our continued well-being and growth, and we
must proclaim to our competitors that we are in these industries, and we
are going to stay. No company can make this statement, only a country
can. I I
110. Open-architecture receivers require more hardware and software than receivers designed to
accept a single transmission standard, and thus would create a greater demand for related technolo-
gies. See PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS, supra note 22, at 312 (Action Memo by Hugh Donahue,
MIT).
111. 135 CONG. REC. H1816 (daily ed. May 10, 1989) (statement of Rep. Lipinski).
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The HDTV industry is one industry where we can and must make a
stand. If legislation to promote cooperative ventures and provide re-
search funding for HDTV is seen as too radical a departure from tradi-
tional ideals, the federal government should at least refrain from harming
domestic companies that are struggling to compete with huge, well-
funded foreign companies by selecting standards better suited for our
competitors' systems. The Japanese NHK production standard will be
outdated soon, and there is no compelling reason the United States
should adopt it while the Europeans refuse to. It is in the best interests
of the United States, with its large domestic HDTV market, to formulate
its own standard. The FCC should adopt transmission standards that
further growth within the domestic HDTV industry, but not at the ex-
pense of local broadcasting, which is the only free source of video pro-
gramming and news; a simulcast system will give broadcasters a chance
to compete. A single transmission standard for all media is not neces-
sary; all that is needed is a family of standards that will not constrain
alternative media. The standards chosen by the federal government will
send a message to U.S. companies contemplating entrance into the
HDTV industry. The importance of HDTV to U.S. interests should not
be ignored, and the importance of technical standards to the develop-
ment of HDTV in this country demands that standards be wisely chosen.
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